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ARTICLES
REGULATION OF CONDUCT IN RELATION TO LAND-
THE NEED TO PURGE NATURAL LAW CONSTRAINTS
FROM THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
JoHN E. DONALDSON*
[Wie are coming to realize that our land is finite .... [Wie
must accept the idea that none of us has a right to abuse the
land, and ... society as a whole has a legitimate interest in
proper land use.'
National awareness that land is a finite resource has led to recog-
nition of a need for increased regulation of human activity in rela-
tion to land to assure the well-being of present and future genera-
tions.2 Land no longer can be regarded as a commodity to be ex-
ploited in a free market economy according to the perceived self-
interest of its owner.3 It is more than an object of ownership and an
* B.A., University of Richmond; J.D., The College of William and Mary; LL.M., George-
town University. Professor of Law, The College of William and Mary.
1. CouNcIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, FIRST ANNuAL REPORT XI-X[ (1970).
2. See SENATE CoMiM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAxRS, LAND USE PoLICY & PLANNIo
AsSISTANCE Ar, S. REP. No. 197, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 44-46 (1973) [hereinafter cited as S.
REP. No. 197].
The subject of land use regulation should be viewed as a division of the field of public law,
not as a branch of the field of property law. See Hagman, The Teaching of Land-Use Controls
and Planning Law in American Law Schools, 1974 LAim-Us. CoNTioLs ANNuAL 61. Activity,
not property or land, is the true subject of land use regulatory measures. Fundamentally, land
use regulation defines conduct to be proscribed or controlled and prohibits or limits such
conduct by spatial reference. It proceeds from the notion that public authority can prohibit
specified activities if undertaken in designated locations. The objective of this Article is not
to discuss privately held rights or expectations associated with property that can be asserted
against the public, but to ask what activities in relation to land use may be proscribed by
the public.
3. S. EP. No. 197, supra note 2, at 72-73. See also F. BossELM N & D. CALaIs, Tsn QuiEr
REVOLUTIoN IN LAND USE Co NToL (1971) [hereinafter cited as REvoLrioN]; Caldwell, Rights
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ingredient of individual wealth; it is a vital component of the inter-
related and interdependent social, economic, and ecological systems
in which man lives.4
Intensified public concern that land be used properly has led to a
"quiet revolution in land use control."5 This revolution has been
reflected in the adoption of state-wide land use regulatory systems,6
establishment of regional compacts to preserve natural resources
and protect areas of critical environmental significance,7 regulation
of wetlands development," creation of a federal agency to monitor
and allocate national energy resources,' establishment of mecha-
nisms to ration dwindling water resources,"0 and adoption of numer-
ous federal measures to control pollution and protect the environ-
ment."1 In addition, traditional land use control devices are being
modified. Euclidian zoning is yielding to "incentive zoning,)1 2
of Ownership or Rights of Use?-The Need for a New Conceptual Basis for Land Use Policy,
15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 759 (1974).
4. See generally F. CHAPiN, URBAN LAND USE PLANNImG 7-68 (2d ed. 1965); Sax, Takings,
Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 152 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Private
Property].
5. RavoLUToN, supra note 3, at 1.
6. Hawaii, Maine, and Vermont represent the more comprehensive approach. See 13
HAWAU REv. STAT. §§ 205-1 to -8 (1968); Me. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 481-88 (Supp. 1973);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-89 (Supp. 1974). For an analysis of these statutes, see
REVOLuTIoN, supra note 3.
7. The Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, 83 Stat. 360 (1969), provides for planning and
regulation of development in the Lake Tahoe area by the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
a board representing the states of California and Nevada, and the affected localities.
8. For an analysis of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 1280, and a survey
of state wetlands and coastal area regulation systems, see J. Ludwigson; Coastal Zone Man-
agement, A Whole New Ball Game (ENv. REP. Monograph No. 18, March 8, 1974).
9. Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 761-86 (Supp. 1975).
10. See, e.g., Groundwater Act of 1973, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.83 to -.107 (Supp. 1974).
11. See, eg., Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 16 U.S.C.A. §§
1251-1376 (Supp. 1975); Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1857-58(a) (Supp.
1975), amending 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1857-58(a) (1969); National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
Congressional consideration also has been given to a me~sure designed to encourage
broader state involvement in land use regulation, including identification and conservation
of prime agricultural lands threatened by urbanization. See Land Use Policy and Planning
Assistance Act, S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (passed by Senate in 1973, but companion
measure defeated in House of Representatives in 1974, Trevaskis, National Land Use Policy,
9 REAL PROP., PRoB. & Tr. J. 639, 639 (1974)).
12. Incentive zoning, also known as bonus zoning, "undertakes to add an affirmative thrust
to. . .land use regulations by encouraging the establishment of uses regarded as desirable,
or by inducing the addition of desirable features when new construction is carried out. It is a
carrot-and-stick technique which employs administrative concessions to induce needed
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"timed growth zoning,"' 3 "conditional zoning,"' 4 "performance
standard zoning," and "floating zoning." 6 Subdivision ordinances
often preserve open space by requiring land dedication exactions, or
fees in lieu thereof, as a condition to development approval."
"Transferable development rights" have been recommended as a
technique to limit density and preserve open space.'8 Efforts to re-
vise standard state enabling legislation for local land use control are
currently in progress."9 Simultaneously, considerable scholarly at-
construction or desired features thereof." . ANDERSoN, Naw YORK ZONING LAW AND PRAtCE
§ 8.16 (1973).
13. Timed growth zoning involves regulation to assure that new development occurs at a
rate consistent with the growth of public services and amenities to enable the latter to meet
the needs of the former. See Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
14. "Conditional zoning" is a term which "is used to describe a zoning ordinance which
permits a use in a zoning district subject to conditions other than the routine requirements
relating to setbacks, yards, height. ... R. ANDnmsN, supra note 12, § 8.13.
15. See International Harvester Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 43 Il. App. 2d 440, 193
N.E.2d 856 (1963) (upholding performance standard zoning regulations in manufacturing dis-
trict); N. WUIMIs, Tm STuorunE OF URBAN ZONING 218, 222-23 (1966).
16. The term "floating zoning" designates "a method of zoning whereby selected uses of
property are authorized in districts devoted to other uses under terms and conditions laid
down in the ordinances themselves." Although arguably in violation of statutory require-
ments that zoning ordinances be enacted in accordance with comprehensive community
plans, "[t]he argument for the procedure is based on the premise that applications for...
exceptions, being based on standards and safeguards, can properly be treated as a part of a
comprehensive plan." 1 E. Yooxm, ZONING LAw AND PRACTICE § 3-7, at 133-34 (1965).
For examples of other modifications of traditional zoning methods, see Orinda Homeowners
Comm. v. Board of Supervisors, 11 Cal. App. 3d 768, 90 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970) (approving use
of "cluster development" concept that allows density of development on portion of tract in
order to have remainder of tract free of buildings); Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc.,
429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968)(use of "density zoning" whereby legislature determines
percentages of land in a district to be developed for residential.units or left for open space,
and task of allocating land to each use left to planning commission); Millbrae Ass'n for
Residential Survival v. City of Millbrae, 262 Cal. App. 2d 222, 69 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1968)(recog-
nition of concept of "planned unit development" involving flexible application of zoning
classification and diversification in structure location and other site qualities); Sante Fe v.
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964) (affirming conviction for violation of
city zoning ordinance that created historical district pursuant to legislation enabling munici-
palities to adopt comprehensive zoning plan for general welfare of locality).
17. See generally Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Com-
munity Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 Y.ALE L.J. 1119
(194); Johnston, Constitutionality of Subdivision Control Exactions: The Quest for a
Rationale, 52 ComESLL L.Q. 871 (1967); Note, Subdivision Exactions in California: Expansion
of MunicipalPower, 23 HASTGs L.J. 403 (1972). See also Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 862 (1972).
18. Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban
Landmarks, 85 HAiv. L. Rsv. 574 (1972).
19. See, e.g., MODEL LAND DWLOFImENT CODE (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-5,1968-1973). The latest
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
tention has been focused on the adequacy of the legal system to
accommodate the changes and pressures underway in the field of
land use planning."
Increasing numbers of landowners, finding state and local land
use controls frustrative of their expectations and aspirations, con-
tend in litigation that they have been deprived of property "without
due process of law." 21 A taking of property for public use without
compensation may violate the fourteenth amendment to the Consti-
tution, and excessive regulation of the use of property may be a
"taking."m Although "[tjhere is no set formula to determine where
regulation ends and taking begins,"2 it is the line between "regula-
tion" and "taking" that limits the capability of legislatures to con-
trol the use of land in the public interest.
Traditionally, this line has been drawn by applying decisional
rules on a case-by-case basis.u Careful study of these decisional
rules and their natural law origins will reveal, however, that they
are inadequate, discredited by experience, obsolete, and founded
upon jurisprudential doctrines no longer deserving of judicial adher-
ence. The needs of modern society demand that the fourteenth
amendment be purged of the natural law constraints that underlie
these rules. A significantly more limited review of the constitution-
ality of land use control measures should be performed by the
courts, based not only upon the suggested removal of natural law
limitations, but also upon an understanding of property as a dy-
namic concept that can be changed as the public's needs demand.
draft of the Model Code departs significantly from the approach of traditional enabling
statutes by treating development activity rather than land as the focal point of regulatory
systems. See note 2 supra.
20. See, e.g., F. BossELmAN, D. CALXES & J. BANTA, 'Tm TAKwG IssuE (1973); Dunham,
Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective, 1962 S. Or. Rav. 63; Michelman, Property, Utility,
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation"Law, 80 HAv.
L. REv. 1165 (1967); Private Property, supra note 4; Sax, Takings and Police Power, 74 YALE
L.J. 36 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Police Power]; Van Aistyne, Taking or Damaging by
Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. Rv. 1 (1971).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
22. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
23. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
24. Private Property, supra note 4, at 150.
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DECISIONAL RULES IN THE TwENTmTH CENTURY
The general rule at least is, that while property may be regu-
lated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.Y
The decisional rules generally employed to distinguish permissi-
ble regulation of land from prohibited deprivation of property ema-
nate from principles articulated by the Supreme Court in three land
use cases in the 1920's. The first, and perhaps foremost, is
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,2" in which a statute regulating
subsurface mining operations was challenged. Although designed to
avert destruction of dwellings, streets, and utilities, and to assure
personal safety at the surface level, the statute effectively prevented
Pennsylvania Coal Company from mining significant portions of its
holdings.Y
Reasoning that, without limitations on the police power of the
states, the due process clause would be nullified, the Court invalida-
ted the regulation.2 The Court held that when the diminution in
value caused by a regulation reaches a certain magnitude, "in most
if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to sustain the act" and such regulation must be "rea-
sonable" to be valid. 2 The Court also noted that the value of the
right to mine coal "is that it can be exercised with profit. To make
if commercially impractical to mine certain coal has very nearly the
same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroy-
ing it. ' ' s5 This rationale provided protection under the fourteenth
amendment for the expectation of profitable use of land.31
25. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
26. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
27. Id. Injunctive relief, sought in order to enforce compliance with the statute, perhaps
was more difficult to allow because the complaining landowner had derived title from the
mining company through a deed in which it reserved all mineral rights with exculpation from
any liability for damage to the surface owner caused by subsurface mining. Id. at 412.
28. Id. at 413.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 414.
31. The statute in Mahon clearly was aimed at a noxious, harmful activity. Also, the
statutes prohibitions were addressed to a class of activities and applied in municipal areas
throughout Pennsylvania, rather than at geographically identified locations. In this regard,
Mahon cannot be reconciled with prior Supreme Court decisions. In Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623 (1887) (prohibition of manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors), and Powell v.
Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888) (prohibition of manufacture and sale of oleomargarine),
1974]
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In the second major case of the 1920's, Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co. ,32 the use of zoning to control and allocate land uses by
map reference was sustained against charges that the technique on
its face was a deprivation of property without due process of law,
and, because of lack of uniformity, a denial of equal protection
under the law." The Court acknowledged, however, that a zoning
measure valid on its face, nonetheless, could be so unreasonable in
its application to particular property that it would be an invalid
exercise of the police power under the due process clause.3 Shortly
thereafter, in the third 1920's case, Nectow v. City of Cambridge,35
the Court confirmed its dicta in Euclid by invalidating an ordinance
as applied to a particular parcel. The Court emphasized both the
diminution in value caused by zoning property for residential use
when it was unsuited for such use and the regulation's denial of all
reasonable uses while serving no public interest3
Having thus vitiated the force of earlier decisions sustaining state
power to regulate the use and enjoyment of land,37 the Court, appar-
ently believing its delphic pronouncements sufficient, remained si-
lent for more than 30 years." During those years the Court contin-
ued to invalidate both state and federal social and economic legisla-
tion that lacked the requirements of "substantive due process." 3
But once validated by Euclid and reinforced by the publication of
the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act" and the Standard City
Planning Enabling Act,4" zoning and subdivision control took the
the Court upheld statewide regulation of activities deemed offensive by the legislature, not-
withstanding extreme financial loss to property and business.
32. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
33. Id. at 395.
34. Id. at 387.
35. 227 U.S. 183 (1928).
36. Id. at 187-88.
37. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (requiring cessation of brick
manufacturing); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (closing livery stables in urban
areas); Fertilizing Co. v. HydePark, 97 U.S. 659 (1878) (limiting operation of fertilizer plant).
38. Not until Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), was the Court to
reconsider state and local power to regulate land use.
39. For a survey of decisions during the era of substantive due process, which lasted from
the late 1800's until the 1930's, see Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479, 507-27 (1965).
40. U.S. DEsVT OF COMMERCE, STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING AcT (1928). See D. HAG-
MAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAw 80 (1971).
41. U.S. DEP'T OF COMmRCE, A STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING Acr (1928). See D.
HAGMAN, supra note 40, at 48.
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nation by storm; state and federal courts faced a concomitant bar-
rage of litigation by offended property owners alleging deprivation
of property without due process of law.42
It is not surprising that courts primarily sought thereafter to de-
termine whether land use controls were reasonable in relation to the
particular parcel of land in question." Admonished to resolve doubt
in the legislature's favor when reasonableness was "fairly debata-
ble,"" the courts, nevertheless, could determine what in fact was
fairly debatable. If a particular measure was deemed reasonable, it
would be labeled a "valid exercise of the police power"; when it
failed the reasonableness test, it would, in substantive due process
language, be labeled "arbitrary," "capricious," "discriminatory,"
"confiscatory," or simply "unreasonable." Any of these appellations
indicated that the requirements of due process were not met."
Generally, these decisions have been exercises in circuitous rea-
soning. 6 Courts have acknowledged that all property is held subject
to the police power, under which property rights can be limited, but
have given distressingly little attention to the scope, nature, or role
of the notion of police power. Moreover, the idea that property sub-
ject to alleged deprivation is itself a creature of a sovereign state,
taking its character from legislation and common law principles
observed by that state," virtually has been ignored. The concept of
"due process of law" rarely is analyzed in terms of when process
created by legislation is "due." Rather, the term functions as a
bridge from unconstitutional, forbidden actions to constitutional
and permissible exercises of police power. If a court views the police
power as sufficiently broad to span the gap, property rights may be
limited; if the court deems the power insufficiently broad, property
rights are "vested" and may not be "impaired." But how long is the
bridge, and how much weight can it bear before collapsing? Can the
42. See I R. ANDERSON, AtmmcAN LAw oF ZONING §§ 2.07-.10 (1968).
43. Although the Supreme Court has retreated significantly from its substantive due pro-
cess orientation to the fourteenth amendment, several state courts remain faithful to that
dogma. See Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MiN. L.
Rav. 91 (1950); Comment, Substantive Due Process in the States Revisited, 18 OHO ST. L.J.
384 (1957).
44. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 368 (1926).
45. See generally 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 42, §§ 2.19-.30.
46. See Van Alstyne, supra note 20, at 2.
47. For a persuasive justification of this notion of property, see Philbrick, Changing Con-
ceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. Rav. 691 (1938); Powell, The Relationship Between
Property Rights and Civil Rights, 15 HASMGs L.J. 135 (1963).
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chasm be spanned? These questions generally have been resolved by
courts rather than legislatures, relying upon varying degrees of judi-
cial omniscience to reach sometimes discordant results."
To evaluate the validity of the decisional axioms that have been
discussed, it is necessary to examine the source of the premise un-
derlying their development and to decide whether their continued
application is justified. This examination will expose the unnatural
wedding of natural law to the fourteenth amendment, the procrea-
tion of a unique notion of "police power," a field of "higher law,"
and a sterile notion of "property."
NATURAL LAW WEDDED TO THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Legislation falls within the "due process" clauses when it is
such as rational men may approve. Taken seriously, this con-
ception makes of our courts lunacy commissions sitting injudg-
ment upon the mental capacity of legislators and, occassionally,
of judicial bretheren .... The fact, then, that reasonable men
approve of specific legislation does not prevent it from being a
violation of "due process of law.""
The judicial vocabulary regarding limitations on the power to
48. It is one thing to identify a decisional process as circuitious, and another to label the
product of that process a miasma of inconsistencies. No effort will be made to analyze
separately the land use control cases decided since Mahon, as that analysis has been con-
ducted exhaustively by others. The consensus of these commentators is that judicial attempts
to reconcile public control with private property have malfunctioned seriously. One commen-
tator has noted, for example, that the "decisional law is largely characterized by confusing
and incompatible results, often explained in conclusionary terminology, circular reasoning,
and empty rhetoric." Van Alstyne, supra note 20, at 2. Michelman, supra note 20, at 1171,
has concluded that the results of the decisional process are "ethically unsatisfying," while
Dunham, supra note 20, at 64, calls them a "haphazard accumulation of rules." Several
commentators consider this uncertainty an obstruction to effective legislative efforts to create
needed land use controls. See, e.g., Private Property, supra note 4, at 150. Another, focusing
on the confiscation issue where regulation allegedly has resulted in severe diminution in
value, has noted the roughly equivalent diminution both in cases in which the exercise of
police power has been held valid and in those in which a denial of due process was found. I
R. ANDERSON, supra note 42, § 2.23.
Attempts have been made to reconcile apparent inconsistencies by classifying cases accord-
ing to such factors as the regulation's purpose or its burdensome consequences, the relation-
ship between the public interest asserted and the private detriment suffered, and the evil to
be cured by the regulation. See authorities cited in note 20 supra. But these efforts have not
provided a means by which judicial action can be predicted. Clearly, if the utility of legal
rules in a jurisprudential system can be judged by their predictability, the rules employed to
determine where regulation of land use ends and taking of property begins are useless.
49. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense, 35 CoLUM. L. Ray. 809, 819 (1935).
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regulate land use stresses the words "police power," "due process
of law," and "property." Due process is the bridge that spans the
chasm between state power and private right. Thus "due process"
protects, defines, and limits "property" while defining and limiting
legislative capacity or "police power." Jurisprudential techniques of
defining legal concepts in terms of other legal concepts, however,
appropriately have been labeled "transcendental nonsense";;° close
scrutiny of the substantive due process concept developed in land
use law demonstrates the aptness of that phrase.
Police Power
In the jurisprudence of other nations that follow the Anglo-Saxon
common law tradition, the term "police power"51 is a descriptive
term, significant only to lawyers and political scientists who employ
it to describe the class of powers that governments traditionally
choose to exercise;52 the term does not connote a limitation on gov-
ernment action, nor does it provide immunities from governmental
interference attached to property rights. In these countries the ques-
tions of whether legislation is reasonable, arbitrary, capricious,
wise, appropriate, just, or necessary are regarded as meaningful in
the political arena only, and are of no concern to judges. 3
Nevertheless, the functional, rather than descriptive, role of the
term "police power," has been accepted in jurisprudence in the
United States by the Supreme Court. Under the police power,
"property rights may be cut down, and to that extent taken, without
pay,"' 5 but "[1]egislatures may not, under the guise of the police
power, impose restrictions that are unnecessary and unreasonable
upon the use of private property or the pursuit of useful activities."55
50. Id.
51. The police power has received little recent attention from commentators. For an analy-
sis of the origins and functions of the term, and its different roles in the United States and
other Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions, see C. Mum, THB RsvAL oF NATuPAx. LAW CONCM, S
(1930); Cook, What is thePolice Power?, 7 CoLuM. L. RPv. 322 (1907). See also Grant, Natural
Law Background of Due Process, 31 CoLum. L. Ray. 56 (1931).
52. Such traditional powers include the power to make and enforce laws and regulations
for the promotion of public health and domestic order. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); Lawton v. Steele, 152
U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
53. C. H NEs, supra note 51, at 135-36.
54. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921).
55. Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121 (1928).
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Yet the police power is "one of the most essential powers of govern-
ment, one that is the least limitable. It may, indeed, seem harsh in
its exercise, usually is on some individual, but the imperative ne-
cessity for its existence precludes any limitation upon it when not
exerted arbitrarily.""5 Despite the importance of the concept, the
Supreme Court has stated:
An attempt to define its reach .. is fruitless, for each case
must turn on its own facts. The definition is essentially the
product of legislative determinations addressed to the purposes
of government, purposes neither abstractly nor historically cap-
able of complete definition....
Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law
and order-these are some of the more conspicuous examples of
the traditional application of the police power to municipal af-
fairs.57
It "connotes the time-tested conceptional limit of public encroach-
ment upon private interests. Except for the. . . familiar standard
of 'reasonableness,' this Court has generally refrained from an-
nouncing any specific criteria.""8 The police power is expansive and
"may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by
the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be
greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare."59
These descriptions all were expressed after the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment; before that time, the Court concurred in the
descriptive meaning of the police power, usually phrasing it in terms
of residual sovereign power." Only when natural law was grafted
onto the amendment did the term gain operative significance as a
doctrine of constitutional law. As legislatures during the nineteenth
century became more active in the development of rules of positive
law and undertook costly programs of public improvements, while
also exhibiting a willingness to use public funds to subsidize private
ventures, the notion that governmental power should be limited
gained political acceptance in conservative economic circles. 1 The
56. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915).
57. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
58. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
59. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911).
60. See, e.g., Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
61. For a history of the philosophic, legal, and economic development of this viewpoint,
see C. HAwEs, supra note 51, at 75-103.
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concept of government as a "social compact," 2 instituted to secure
inalienable and natural rights, was revived. Limitation of natural
rights could not be a valid purpose for a government so instituted;
government, therefore, had to be limited in accordance with the
principle of "free government.""3 The jurisprudential expression of
this political concept is "natural law."
Perhaps the best exposition of the emergence and ascendancy of
natural law in American jurisprudence is that of Professor Haines.4
To Chancellor Kent he attributed the origination of the notion that
"police power" is a term having operative significance. 5 Kent, hav-
ing concluded that rights to property and liberty were natural rights
protected by higher law, nonetheless conceded that positive law,
expressed through legislation, could in appropriate cases circum-
scribe natural rights. These appropriate cases were denominated
exercises of the police power, in accordance with "fundamental
principles."6 Professor Haines concluded:
Police power as a constitutional concept is a judge-made con-
cept arising from the assumption that legislatures are disposed
to fritter away constitutional [natural law] inhibitions and
that it is the duty of judges to prevent such legislative depreda-
tions. The term "police power" was hit upon as a convenient
phrase for the courts to determine whether a legislative act
which interfered with private rights was reasonable enough to
have judicial approval."'
62. Id. at 95.
63. Id.
64. C. Hmms, supra note 51.
65. Id. at 92-93. Haines refers to 2 J. KENT, CommETAniEs 340 (13th ed. 1884) in support
of his conclusion.
66. C. Hmms, supra note 51, at 95.
67. Id. at 182. The most influential jurist committed to natural law principles was Justice
Field, whose dissent in the Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83 (1872), marks
the emergence of natural law as the foundation of substantive due process. Justice Field,
although willing to strike down unreasonable legislation, apparently believed that "police
power" could be defined with sufficient precision to enable it to function in constitutional
adjudication. In Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885), when upholding the regulation of
public laundries in San Francisco against claims premised upon the fourteenth amendment,
he observed that the amendment was not "designed to interfere with the power of the State,
sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace,
morals, education, and good order of the leople, and to legislate so as to increase the indus-
tries of the State, develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity." Id. at 31.
Justice Field's definition of police power apparently contemplates a relatively narrow warrant
for legislative activity. As later courts, consciously or unconsciously, interpreted the term
more broadly, the requirement of reasonableness was added.
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Due Process of Law
Natural law principles were reflected in diversity cases in the
federal courts long before their incorporation into constitutional
law. In Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,6 8 finding a "clear principle of
natural equity""6 in a state constitution, the Court required a utility
to pay compensation for the statutorily authorized flooding of pri-
vate land. Yet in several cases decided under the fourteenth amend-
ment prior to 1884, the Court expressly declined to find that "due
process" meant "conformity to principles of natural law."70 The
Court occasionally noted that due process was a procedural limita-
tion, and that for "protection against abuses by legislatures the
people must resort to the polls, not to the courts."
Natural law and the fourteenth amendment were wedded in a
series of cases decided in the last fifteen years of the nineteenth
century,72 and the marriage lasted until 1937.13 Although legislative
process in other countries, reflecting the popular will expressed
through duly constituted bodies, is always "due,"" until 1937 legis-
lative process in this country was "due" only when judges were
satisfied that it was reasonable.15
Property-A "theme especially apposite for amplificative
philosophic disquisition""
Prior to 1885, when the fourteenth amendment was regarded es-
sentially as a procedural limitation,7 7 it was unnecessary to define
68. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
69. Id. at 179. This principle was read into the state constitution notwithstanding the state
court's unwillingness to do so. Although Pumpelly was decided three years after the adoption
of the fourteenth amendment, the Court apparently believed that the amendment was not
applicable.
70. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877); United States v. Cruickshank, 92 U.S.
542 (1875); Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). See also C. HAwS, supra
note 51, at 145-49.
71. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876).
72. See C. HAsNEs, supra note 51, at 149.65.
73. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), reversing the rule established in
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), constitutes a clear retreat from natural
law analysis of the due process clause, at least-in the area of economic regulation. Compare
261 U.S. at 548-55, 561, with 300 U.S. at 391-93, 397-400.
74. See notes 51-53 supra & accompanying text.
75. See notes 54-59 supra & accompanying text.
76. Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 560 (1915).
77. See C. HAINEs, supra note 51, at 143-49, 154-65.
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the meaning of the term "property" as used in that amendment in
relation to permissible legislation. After 1885 it also was unneces-
sary for the Court to so define the term because the process of
determining whether legislation was reasonable was concomitant to
determining whether the liberty, privilege, course of conduct, or
expectation asserted by the individual was or was not, in law, pro-
tected. Thus, the right to employment,78 to contract,79 and to liberty
in the conduct of business80 became "property," but a precise defini-
tion of the term was not articulated.
Understandably, a court, finding the legal term "property" im-
precise and clarification unnecessary to the disposition of its cases,
might defer formulation of a usable definition to those willing to
undertake the requisite "amplificative philosophic disquisition."81
Common law traditions have never recognized a property right of
private land use assertable against a state.8 2 It is, of course, possible
for legal interests and expectations to be created that cannot be
altered by subsequent state action, 3 but whether such interest and
expectations have been created in "property" is doubtful.
American notions of property, derived from the common law of
England, are manifestations of legal rules developed to resolve con-
flicts between private persons over the right to possess, enjoy, and
use land.u These concepts of property thus should be meaningful
only to resolve private disputes; they should not suggest any delimi-
tation of public power to regulate the use and enjoyment of land.
In fact, under the common law, all rights in property are subordi-
nate to the interests of the state. The common law recognized only
tenures held of the state, which retained paramount title; the terms
of such tenure were subject to definition by the state. Never did the
common law recognize a notion of unfettered private ownership of
land.85 Notwithstanding these traditional precepts, the Supreme
78. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
79. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
80. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
81. Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 560 (1915).
82. This status of property continues in England. See text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
For a discussion of English legislative supremacy, in relation to the power to change the
common law, and lack of judicial review of parliamentary enactments, see H. PMnurs, A
FIRSm BooK oF ENGLISH LAw 104-08 (6th ed. 1970).
83. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135-37 (1810).
84. See generally Philbrick, supra note 47; Powell, supra note 47.
85. For a survey of legislative limitations on the use of property prior to 1779, and documen-
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Court's land use decisions during the era of substantive due pro-
cess" reflected an assumption that title to land includes a right of
use that can be asserted against a state when the police power is
used in a manner deemed improper by the courts. Despite this
reliance upon a right to use property, however, the Court artfully
evaded the key definitional question.87
When a state regulates land use or enables its localities to under-
take such regulation, the state's action rests on an assumption that
all land is held under a servitude in favor 6f the state, thereby
redefining the bundle of property rights possessed by the landowner.
Although the Supreme Court apparently has not been confronted
with the issue of a state's power to redefine property rights in the
context of land use regulation, the issue has been met in other
contexts, in which the Court has refrained from placing a natural
law gloss on property and has not assumed that property enjoys a
federal constitutional definition unalterable by the states." Some of
tation of the assertion that the desire to use land is not a right that can be asserted against
the state, see F. BossEuN, D. CALUIS & J. BmATA, supra note 20, at 51-88.
86. See notes 26-36 supra & accompanying text.
87. Property rights clearly are creatures of the state and derive their content, utility, and
role from that source. Property rights are not protected by the courts; rather, what the courts
protect constitutes property rights. See Powell, supra note 47, at 145. As Justice Jackson
once stated: "[O]nly those economic advantages are 'rights' which have the law back of
them. . . .We cannot start the process of decision by calling such a claim as we have here a
'property right'; whether it is a property right is really the question to be answered." United
States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502-03 (1945).
The Supreme Court acknowledged early that the fourteenth amendment created no new
rights, but only guaranteed that existing rights be equally secure to all. Ex parte Virginia,
100 U.S. 339 (1879). There is no clear indication that the proponents of the fourteenth
amendment intended to create new classes of liberties and rights in property; rather, the
emphasis was on equality of rights. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973) (fourteenth amendment did not create a right to education). It therefore is
not clear how the right to use land, when asserted against a state declining to recognize that
right, gained its legal status. Possibly, state law could provide some insight into the question
whether such a right exists in a given situation; but it then may be unclear whether the
relevant state law is that presently in force, or that in effect at the time of the fourteenth
amendments adoption. Reliance on state law also would raise questions about the state's
ability to redefine that law and questions regarding the extent to which natural law must be
incorporated into the state's identification of property rights assertable against it. If natural
law must be included in a state's definition of property and the resultant protected rights,
still unanswered is the question whether natural law itself is a static concept or a dynamic
principle that can change with the altered needs of society. Unanswered by the courts, these
questions draw into doubt the notion of property as a source of rights deserving constitutional
protection under the guise of substantive due process.
88. See notes 89-96 infra & accompanying text. See also Yecko v. Township of Penn, 387
F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1967) (zoning ordinance depriving land owner of use of land as automobile
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these cases have allowed the states to alter their property laws even
when the state itself gains by the redefinition. While leaving unful-
filled the basic need for a clear statement of the limits of the rights
accompanying ownership of property, these cases do indicate that
property is a dynamic term that may be redefined by the state
without affronting the due process clause.
In Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina,"' a public utility
claimed, under its charter, the property right to abandon partially
its railway and power franchise. Upholding the state court's issu-
ance of a writ of mandamus against the company, the Supreme
Court declined to determine whether "the rule applied by the state
court [was] right or wrong, or substitute its own view of what
should be deemed the better rule, for that of the state court."" In
Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Commission," the Supreme Court
upheld a Wisconsin court's determination that a riparian owner had
no right to dam a stream in the face of state objection. The Court
stated:
We are not concerned with the correctness of the rule adopted
by the state court, its conformity to authority, or its consistency
with related legal doctrine .... It is for the state court in cases
such as this to define rights in land located within the state, and
the Fourteenth Amendment, in the absence of an attempt to
forestall our review of the constitutional question, affords no
protection to supposed rights of property which the state courts
determine to be non-existent. 2
wrecking and parts jard upheld because "existing use" of the land prior to enactment did
not create a "vested interest" protected by the United States Constitution); Standard Oil Co.
v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950) (ordinance requiring plaintiff to discon-
tinue use of land as gasoline filling station upheld). "[Clonsiderations of ... so-called
'vested rights' in private property are insufficient to outweigh the necessity for legitimate
exercise of the police power of a municipality."Id at 413. Although it might be assumed that
a right exists, for example, to dispose of property by a will at death, the'Supreme Court has
acknowledged that "[r]ights to succession by will are created by the state and may be
limited, conditioned, or abolished by it." Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S.
36, 48 (1944) (dictum). This language suggests that states could require escheat upon death
of the owner of land, or require that property passing at death be held thereafter only upon
conditions imposed by the state. Due process requirements were imposed upon the suspension
from school of an Ohio student, not because the fourteenth amendment itself created a
property interest in public education, but because Ohio statutes created an entitlement that
the fourteenth amendment would protect. Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 735-36 (1975).
89. 281 U.S. 537 (1930).
90. Id. at 541.
91. 274 U.S. 651 (1927).
92. Id. at 657. Another Supreme Court ruling denied the right of a state court to redefine
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Whatever doubts may exist about a legislature's power to redefine
or change property rights or vested contract rights, courts seemingly
are free to overrule their prior decisions upon which such rights are
based without violating the due process clause, at least where the
change affects only private parties.13 Moreover, when clearly con-
fronted with the issue of whether, under the due process clause,
property has been taken, federal courts have looked to state law to
determine whether, in fact, there is property to be confiscated. 4 In
1944 the Supreme Court considered, in a due process context, a
change in state law relating to the duties of trustees under testa-
mentary trusts involving the rights of income and remainder benefi-
ciaries. 5 To the complaining remainderman, the Court answered:
Nothing in the Federal Constitution would warrant us in
holding that judicial rules tentatively put forward and leaving
much to discretion will deprive the legislature of power to make
further reasonable rules which in its opinion will expedite and
make more equitable the distribution of millions of dollars of
property locked in testamentary trusts, even if they do affect the
values of various interests and expectancies under the trust.
Although the Supreme Court thus has upheld legislation that
alters the property rights of private litigants and sustained judicial
property rights in land acquired under federal land grants, where the state claimed title to
former river beds and coastal accretions under doctrines incompatible with federal common
law applicable at the time of the original land patent. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290
(1967). See notes 97-101 infra & accompanying text. The decision, however, was based for-
mally on construction of federal grants and statutes and the constitutional prohibition on
impairment of contracts, rather than upon the due process clause.
93. See, e.g., Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924); cf Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst
Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932) (state courts may use discretion in giving retroactive or
prospective effect to decisions overruling prior cases on which "vested" rights are based);
Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U.S. 103 (1895).
94. For example, when faced with a contention that Louisiana's invasion of private land
to construct a levee constituted a taking without due process, the Supreme Court indicated
that under Louisiana law no property was taken because a dominant servitude burdening
riparian lands in favor of the state permitted flood control projects to be undertaken without
an obligation to compensate affected landowners. Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U.S. 70 (1908)
(dictum) (held that the Court lacked jurisdiction because of the absence of a necessary party,
the United States). Similarly, the Court found no private property rights assertable within
the bounds of land set aside for a party wall because, under Pennsylvania law, such land was
subject to a servitude for party wall purposes. Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22 (1922).
It should be acknowledged, however, that both Garfield and Jackman involved federal court
cognizance of established local law doctrines, rather than new determinations of that law.
95. Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36 (1944).
96. Id. at 48-49.
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decisions modifying such rights, the Court has not confronted spe-
cifically the propriety of legislation that alters property rights be-
tween private individuals and the state. Nonetheless, the question
was latent in Hughes v. Washington,7 in which Justice Stewart's
concurring opinion expressed a viewpoint later approved in dictum
by the Court." Hughes involved the status of title to land rather
than regulation of land use. A state constitutional provision9 had
been interpreted by the supreme court of Washington inconsistently
with its previously understood meaning. As a result, accretions to
the coast were held to belong not to the owner of oceanfront property
but to the state. Although the Supreme Court majority found for the
protesting property owner ' without resort to the due process clause,
Justice Stewart based his concurring opinion on it, expressing con-
cern about unanticipated changes in the law:
We cannot resolve the federal question whether there has been
such a taking without first making a determination of our own
as to who owned the seashore accretions between 1889 and 1966.
To the extent that the decision of the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington on that issue arguably conforms to reasonable expecta-
tions, we must of course accept it as conclusive. But to the
extent that it constitutes a sudden change in state law, unpre-
dictable in terms of the relevant precedents, no such deference
would be appropriate. For a State cannot be permitted to defeat
the constitutional prohibition against taking property without
due process of law by the simple device of asserting retroactively
that the property it has taken never existed at all.10'
Justice Stewart's concern with due process protection against
unexpected change in state laws relating to property may be re-
flected in more recent statements by the Supreme Court in which
property rights are expressed in terms of expectancy and reliance.
In a procedural due process case, Board of Regents v. Roth,12 a
teacher alleged denial of due process because of the termination,
without hearing, of his expectancy of continued employment. The
Court declared that a "unilateral expectation" of a benefit was not
97. 889 U.S. 290 (1967).
98. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 94 S. Ct. 517, 528-29 (1973).
99. WASH. CONST. art. 17, § 1.
100. 389 U.S. at 294.
101. Id. at 296-97.
102. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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property within the scope of procedural due process, 0 but added:
"It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those
claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must
not be arbitrarily undermined." '' The Court's statements thus sup-
port the utilitarian role of property in maintaining a stable society,
rather than a view that mere individual expectancies generate prop-
erty interests. Moreover, even Professor Michelman, who espoused
a utilitarian theory, did not regard property as a static concept; he
acknowledged that its utilitarian function required versatility in
relation to changing needs."0 ' Other commentators also have
stressed the dynamic role of property in its capacity, through judi-
cial and legislative input, to respond to emerging societal needs by
contraction, alteration, and redefinition."'
Fundamentally, current legislative attempts to subject land de-
velopment to greater public control are efforts to redefine property
rights in land. Any significant impediment to these efforts would
breach the Anglo-Saxon tradition that property, as an institution,
should assume different functional roles as societal needs change.
Recognition of this flexibility by the judiciary and legislatures
clearly is needed if the utilitarian function of property is to remain
effective. Courts and legislatures should be reminded that almost 50
years ago the Supreme Court recognized that changing conditions
may justify new restraints on land use. 17
103. Id. at 577.
104. Id.
105. Michelman, supra note 20, at 1211-13.
106. See, e.g., Horowitz, The Transformation in the Conception of Property in American
Law, 1780-1860, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 248 (1973); Philbrick, supra note 47; Powell, supra note
47; Roberts, The Demise of Property Law, 57 CoRzm L. Rav. 1 (1971). Rights in land have
not always been viewed primarily in terms of rights to profit from its development. Professor
Horowitz, in an excellent analysis of changing conceptions of property between the Revolu-
tionary War and the Civil War, demonstrated that, at the beginning of the period, natural
or agrarian land uses were favored in the law over commercial uses, particularly in the
allocation of water resources and the rules pertaining to riparian rights. Horowitz, supra, at
248-49. He noted, however, that the courts evolved a balancing test to effectuate the increased
economic importance of commercial interests in American society. Id. at 263-64. Thus, the
concept of property, originally encompassing only possession and a right to natural uses,
expanded to include rights to commercial or economic use.
It is not beyond imagination that, given the present level of concern about proper land use,
courts eventually will adopt a view of land ownership that will place less eniphasis upon
developmental rights. As Philbrick noted: "[Tihe first tenet of an adequate philosophy must
be that property is the creature and dependent of law. . . ." Philbrick, supra note 47, at
729.
107. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,386-87 (1926): "Until recent
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THE PRESENT ScoPE OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
The Supreme Court and Natural Law
Discussion of the present scope of the due process clause must
begin with a consideration of the extent to which natural law re-
mains embedded in that clause. Although the era of substantive due
process commonly is regarded as having ended with West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish,' later Supreme Court decisions continued to
reflect natural law notions. In a dissent, which critiqued the sub-
stantive due process era and analyzed clearly the natural law under-
pinnings of decisions during that period, Justice Black urged that
the fourteenth amendment be stripped of natural law. ' He urged
that the amendment be viewed as essentially a civil rights measure
to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.110 Eight years
years, urban life was comparatively simple; but... problems have developed, and con-
stantly are developing which require... additional restrictions in respect of the use and
occupation of private lands in urban communities.... [Wihile the meaning of constitu-
tional guarantees never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet
the new and different conditions.. ."
Perhaps the term "property" has not been defined more clearly in fourteenth amendment
decisions because the Supreme Court has shown greater interest in the frustration of a partic-
ular economic expectation in the use of property than in the meaning of the term itself.
Empirically at least, these cases, such as Mahon and Goldblatt, are concerned with the
justification for a regulation that frustrates economic expectations, not with the question of
whether "property" has been taken without due process of law; thus, economic expectations
have been raised to the status of "property," a status not enjoyed by such expectations in
any other Anglo.Saxon jurisdiction.
In widely varying contexts, the degree to which economic expectations acquired in the
marketplace are realized or frustrated depends upon continuity or change in governmental
policy; values in the securities markets vary as federal fiscal policy changes; profits in rental
property may be diminished by rent controls; expectations in the liquor trade rise and fall
with changes in the law; expectations on the commodities markets are frustrated by export
controls; earnings may be reduced when an individualis drafted into the army; mines become
worthless when the *price of ore is regulated or a labor supply is withdrawn; fortunes are lost
when licenses are not renewed; business opportunities are lost when government restricts the
supply of raw materials. Appropriately, it may be asked why expectations in land use receive
greater protection from governmental interference than other economic expectations. As was
noted in Laycock v. Kenney, 270 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1959): "'a new tariff an embargo, a draft,
or a war, may inevitably bring upon individuals great losses; may, indeed, render valuable
property almost valueless' [but the] harshness of legitimate legislation affords no reason for
considering it to be unconstitutional." Id. at 592, quoting Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.)
457, 551 (1870).
108. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See 2 Mo. L. Rv. 365 (1937).
109. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947).
110. Id.
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later, in Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc.,"' legislation prohibiting
opticians from fitting or duplicating lenses without a prescription
was upheld; Justice Douglas, writing for a unanimous court in an
opinion devoid of natural law notions, emphasized that "'[flor
protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to
the polls, not to the courts.' 1112 Williamson did not end natural law
analysis by the Court, however. Seven years later, in Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead,113 the Court lapsed into a discussion of reason-
ableness, quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon"' with approval.
Perhaps aware of the contradiction between Williamson and
Goldblatt, the Court clarified its position the following year.
Ferguson v. Skrupa s15 involved a Kansas statute limiting the busi-
ness of debt adjustment to attorneys, effectively excluding a num-
ber of persons previously engaged in that business. Reiterating the
Williamson analysis, the Court upheld the statute in a manner that
clearly repudiated natural law notions. The Court's choice of lan-
guage is significant:
Under the system of government created by our Constitution,
it is up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and
utility of legislation....
The doctrine ... that due process authorizes courts to hold
laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has
acted unwisely... has long since been discarded.
[ W]e emphatically refuse to go back to the time when
courts used the Due Process Clause 'to strike down state laws,
regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they
may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particu-
lar school of thought.' Nor are we.. .'willing to draw lines by
calling a law 'prohibitory' or 'regulatory. 16
111. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
112. Id. at 488, quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876).
113. 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (prohibition of excavation at a particular location upheld).
114. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See notes 26-31 supra & accompanying text.
115. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
116. Id. at 729-32, citing Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
In cases decided since Ferguson, the Court has avoided consideration of legislation in terms
of substantive due process and instead has based its decisions on rights to privacy and equal
protection, while enlarging the notion of procedural due process when property interests have
been affected by state action. These decisions, although reflecting natural law concepts, have
not involved questions of "traditional" property rights. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (right to terminate pregnancy); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (right to terminate
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In the post-Goldblatt era, Supreme Court dismissal of appeals
from three state court land use decisions1 ' "for want of a substantial
federal question"' has undermined further the natural law doc-
trines reflected in Mahon and Nectow. In each case the state court
had upheld a regulation that had obliterated the economic useful-
ness of property owned by those challenging the regulation.' More-
over, Ferguson, although not a land use case, also manifested a
resolve by the Court to avoid interference with the legislative do-
main.1 0
One recent land use opinion of the Court, however, does exhibit
natural law overtones. In Village of Belle Torre v. Borass,121 the
pregnancy); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (possessory prolerty interests); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (invalidating provisions of death-by-wrongful-act legislation
discriminatory against bastards); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to use
contraceptives).
117. Markham Advertising Co. v. Washington, 393 U.S. 316 (1969); Desert Outdoor Adver-
tising, Inc. v. County of San Bernardino, 393 U.S. 8 (1968); Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v.
City of Los Angeles, 371 U.S. 36 (1962).
118. Denial of an appeal for this reason is regarded as a disposition on the merits. See Moss
v. Hornig, 214 F. Supp. 324, 329 n.2 (D. Conn. 1962), affld, 314 F.2d 89 (1963); R. STMN &
E. GRosstAN, Supam CouRT PnAcrICE § 4.28 (4th ed. 1969).
119. In Consolidated Rock Products, the California court had held that prohibition of
quarrying at a particular location was valid although the regulation effectively prohibited all
economic use of the property. 57 Cal. 2d 515, ., 370 P.2d 342, 351, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, 647
(1962). Under the doctrines espoused in Mahon and Nectow, this regulation would have been
an invalid "taking" because of the excessive diminution in value through elimination of all
reasonable economic use. Notwithstanding its natural law relapse in Goldblatt, however, the
Court denied the appeal for "want of a substantial federal question." 371 U.S. 36 (1962).
In both Markham Advertising and Desert Outdoor Advertising state courts upheld regula-
tions requiring the removal of signs within specified periods, without compensation for the
residual value of the signs. 73 Wash. 2d 405, .-, 439 P.2d 248, 261 (1968); 255 Cal. App. 2d
765, ___, 63 Cal. Rptr. 543, 545 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968). Significantly, the test used in Mohon
to invalidate Pennsylvania's land subsidence statute was not applied directly to ownership
of "the land," but rather to ownership of a particular incident, mineral rights; when that
particular incident was "taken," due. process was deemed violated. Nevertheless, the Su-
preme Court dismissed each appeal for "want of a substantial federal question," although
undoubtedly the signs were "tAen." 393 U.S. at 316; 393 U.S. at 8.
120. Natural law has not been separated entirely from constitutional law in the post-
Goldblatt cases, however. Although ostensibly divorced from the due process clause, it has
crept into the equal protection clause in the form of certain fundamental rights protected
from state categorization unless the state can offer a compelling reason for their limitation.
See Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. ,av. 1065, 1087-1132
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Equal Protection]. In addition, the ninth amendment has been
suggested as a repository of certain natural rights. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). Justice Black, in dissent, cautioned against a return to natural law principles. Id. at
507. There has been no suggestion, however, that the right to be secure in one's economic
expectations in land use is a fundamental right.
121. 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974).
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Court upheld a zoning ordinance that limited occupancy within a
town to traditional family units, thereby excluding communal
groups. The Court's reliance on police power analysis to reach its
decision suggests the persistence of natural law limitations, since
the notion of police power as an operative legal concept is meaning-
ful only if natural law is embodied in the fourteenth amendment.
Any reliance on Borass as a clear statement of natural law precepts
nonetheless may be misplaced because the permissible scope of the
police power in that case was'exceedingly broad. 22
Recent fourteenth amendment interpretation by the Supreme
Court therefore demonstrates a continued withdrawal from natural
law assumptions. When natural law language has been used, as in
the "police power" analysis in Borass, the Court implicitly has au-
thorized an expansive scope of legislative activity. When consider-
ing natural rights protected substantively by the fourteenth amend-
ment, the Court significantly has declined to hold economic expec-
tations associated with land ownership to be fundamental rights;ss
consequently, no compelling state interest need be shown to justify
a legislative classification that compromises such expectations. 24 It
may be stated confidently that only negligible vestiges of natural
law protection for land ownership rights remain in the Supreme
Court's fourteenth amendment jurisprudence. Recent lower federal
court decisions indicate that this posture of the high court has not
gone unnoticed."5
122. Id. at 1541. The Court noted that the "police power is not confined to elimination of
filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth
values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion, and clean air make the area a sanctuary for
people." Id.
Because of the factual setting in Borass, the Court, finding no due process problem, focused
on the reasonableness of the classification for equal protection purposes. An assumption that
there had been a diminution in value was considered essential if the Court was not to find
the case moot. Id. Because this assumption did not raise a due process problem, Borass
logically may be viewed as a further emasculation of the waning strength of Mahon and
Nectow. Moreover, the denial of "fundamental right" status to land use questions for equal
protection purposes was fortified by the Court's statement that if a classification is" 'reason-
able, not arbitrary,' and bears 'a rational relationship to a [permissible] state objective,'"
no violation occurs. Id. at 1540, quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412
(1920), and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See note 120 supra.
123. Village of Belle Torre v. Borass, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974).
124. For a discussion of circumstances requiring a compelling state interest to support
legislative classification, see Equal Protection, supra note 120.
125. State courts need not follow Supreme Court precedent and interpretational philoso-
phy; they are free to apply more restrictive constitutional notions to legislative power exer-
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Land Use Cases in Lower Federal Courts
[T]he sole question is whether there is a rational relationship
between the ordinance and the promotion of some aspect of the
City's police power-a label which describes the full range of
legitimate public interests. '
In the past decade lower federal courts have shunned Mahon's
diminution-in-value test as a means to invalidate land use regula-
tion. Two courts, for example, have upheld zoning ordinances re-
quiring termination of nonconforming uses.12 One decision was
based on the view that the nonconforming use was not a vested
right;ss the other considered the fourteenth amendment subject to
"the inherent power of the state or municipal governments to make
all rules and regulations with respect to the use and enjoyment of
property rights necessary in the preservation of public health, mor-
als, comfort, order, and safety. ' 12 Other courts, sustaining zoning
ordinances that clearly frustrated economic expectations in land
use, have stated that a violation may be found only if the ordinance
bears no "rational relation to the public health, morals, safety or
general welfare.""' These cases contain no implication that courts
should consider the private detriment suffered and attempt to
balance it against the public interest; rather, the rational relation-
ship required by the fourteenth amendment is a causal relation
between the regulation and effectuation of a proper public purpose.
A regulation therefore that reasonably promotes the public interest
cised under state constitutions. Thus substantive due process, although generally abandoned
by federal courts in constitutional adjudication, persists in several states, where natural law
still flourishes. See note 43 supra. A proper measure, therefore, of the applied meaning of
Supreme Court guidelines for constitutional adjudication in the land use regulation area is
not the response of state courts, but rather that of lower federal courts. See, e.g., Standard
Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950). See also Steel Hill Dev. Inc. v.
Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972); City of St. Paul v. Chicago, S.P.M. & 0.
Ry., 413 F.2d 762 (8th Cir. 1969); Diedrich v. Zoning Comm'n, 393 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
Central Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Miami Beach, 392 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1968).
126. Stone v. City of Maitland, 446 F.2d 83, 87 (5th Cir. 1971).
127. Yecko v. Township of Penn, 387 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1967); Grams v. City of Cudahy,
226 F. Supp. 385 (E.D. Wis. 1964).
128. Yecko v. Township of Penn, 387 F.2d 126, 127 (3d Cir. 1967). See also Standard Oil
Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950).
129. Grams v. City of Cudahy, 226 F. Supp. 385,386 (E.D. Wis. 1964) (upholding require-
ment that pre-existing salvage yard be enclosed).
130. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. City of Chicago, 178 F.2d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 1949). See also Stone
v. City of Maitland, 446 F.2d 83, 87 (5th Cir. 1971).
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by prohibiting a harm or encouraging a benefit will be upheld, even
though it burdens private individuals.
The search for a causal relationship was apparent in Stone v. City
of Maitland,3 ' in which denial of a rezoning application was sus-
tained notwithstanding the resulting frustration of economic expec-
tations. Following Ferguson,'3 2 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, after noting that land use regulations were a type of social
and economic legislation, first observed that "courts do not substi-
tute their social and economic belief for the judgment of legislative
bodies, who are-elected to pass laws,"13' then added: "[T]he sole
question is whether there is a rational relationship between the
ordinance and the promotion of some aspect of the City's police,
power . .. .Y
Reliance on a causal relationship test by lower federal courts does
not imply that the fourteenth amendment is inapplicable to state
and local land use controls. One court has held, for example, that a
state may not impose restrictions to depress land values in advance
of condemnation proceedings in an attempt to reduce the compen-
sation to be paid by the state.135 Another has noted that while adop-
tion of a comprehensive land use plan may be a proper exercise of
legislative power, approval or rejection of tract rezoning is an adju-
dicative proceeding governed by minimum standards of procedural
due process.' Nevertheless, these cases do not reflect the natural
law notions that supported the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Mahon, Euclid, Nectow, and, most recently, Goldblatt; in fact, the
exclusion of such notions from the opinions of the lower federal
courts suggests that those courts refuse to attribute a natural law
premise to the Supreme Court land use precedents.
CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTUS
The decisional rules applied in land use cases by state and federal
courts prior to Goldblatt and Ferguson were emanations of natural
131. 446 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1971).
132. See notes 115-16 supra & accompanying text.
133. 446 F.2d at 86.
134. Id. at 87.
135. Robertson v. City of Salem, 191 F. Supp. 604 (D. Ore. 1961).
136. South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 482 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1973). See Comment, Due
Process-The Adjudicative Decision Inherent in Tract Rezoning Requires the Decision-Makgr
to Adhere to Standards of Minimal Due Process, 8 GA. L. PEv. 254 (1973).
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law principles promulgated by the Supreme Court during the era of
substantive due process. These principles have not resolved effec-
tively the question of where regulation ends and taking begins. Un-
doubtedly for this reason, natural law, as a limitation on the power
of state and local governments to regulate land use, appears to have
been abandoned. Unfortunately, it awaits formal burial by a defini-
tive Supreme Court pronouncement. The Court has continued to
speak of "property" under the fourteenth amendment, primarily in
the context of equal protection rather than due process, without
addressing the fundamental question of whether property itself is a
limitation on state capability to allocate and control uses and re-
sources. It seems apparent, at least, that economic expectations in
land are not "fundamental" rights, and, accordingly, that classifica-
tions which frustrate such expectations need only be rational in a
causal context to be valid. No compelling state interest must be
shown to justify the regulation in relation to the private detriment
suffered. Hence, a diminution-of-value test of the validity of land
use regulations no longer persists; courts need not weigh the public
interest against identifiable private detriment.
The interment of natural law as a fourteenth amendment con-
straint on state power to regulate land use can be accomplished in
a number of ways. Most effective would be a clear statement by the
Supreme Court in an appropriate case. 37 If substantive due process
or natural law is the chasm that protects economic expectations'38
in land use from frustration through the exercise of state power, any
permanent bridge over the chasm effectively would eliminate it as
a barrier; the Supreme Court recently has enunciated an expansive
interpretation of the scope of police power '39 that can function as
that permanent span. The Court also has acknowledged that the
function of "property" is simply to protect expectations in a utili-
tarian sense;"' it must only acknowledge further that, in an increas-.
137. Cf F. BoSsELuAN, D. CALts & J. BATA, supra note 20, at 327.
138. Federal courts are coming to recognize that property and protected expectations are
identical; nevertheless, property is something more than a "unilateral expectation," Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), and a "mere subjective expectancy... is not
a property interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment," Kota v. Little, 473
F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir. 1973).
139. Village of Belle Torre v. Borass, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974). See note 122 supra & accompa-
nying text.
140. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) ("It is a purpose of the ancient
institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives,
'- 'reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined.").
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ingly complex society, the mechanism to identify those expectations
deserving protection must be the legislative, rather than the judi-
cial, forum."'
Legislative power to regulate land use should not be unlimited.
Regulations that apply generally and classify in terms of activity,
function, relationship, or causative elements should be distin-
guished from those that concern specific parcels of land. Controls
that define and protect the public interest by circumscribing classes
of activity without specific spatial reference clearly are legislative
measures. Situs-oriented regulations, however, are primarily ad hoc
determinations' of the state's concern about land use on a parcel-
by-parcel basis; they are quasi-adjudicative and therefore subject to
certain standards of procedural due process.1 3
Another limitation that will remain is the established rule that
state enabling legislation should not be construed to authorize pat-
ently unreasonable local land use regulation.144 This rule, which is
not a limitation of state power to delegate legislative authority but
rather is a rule of statutory construction, can curb ultra vires at-
tempts by localities to regulate land use. Equal protection prohibi-
tions against racial discrimination"' likewise should continue to
apply. Moreover, abandonment of the "invasion" theory of taking,
under which governmental occupancy of private land is compensa-
ble,46 is not advocated.
The fourteenth amendment, properly construed, places no natu-
141. The needed acknowledgment could be express or could be made indirectly by adoption
of legal rules that permit a broader range of legislative activity. Such rules, for example, could
be based upon a recent suggestion that land use regulation should be upheld where the
affected land has spillover effects, burdening either the public or other property owners. See
Private Property, supra note 4, at 161-72. This approach seemingly suggests an expanded
notion of police power while retaining some natural law restraints.
142. See 1 E. YoKmny, ZONING LAW AND PRACicE § 8-2 (1965).
143. "Tjhe adjudicative decision inherent in tract rezoning requires the decision maker
to adhere to concepts of minimal due process." South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 482 F.2d
389, 391 (5th Cir. 1973) (case remanded because evidence outside the record was used and
no reasons were assigned for the decision); cf. Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown, Inc. v. Zoning
Comm'n, 477 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (zoning commission required to indicate reasons for
decision). But See Higginbotham v. Barrett, 473 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1973) (zoning judgments
are legislative in character); Gerstenfeld v. Jett, 374 F.2d 333 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (zoning com-
mission may consider evidence outside the record).
144. See Note, City Government in the State Courts, 78 HARV. L. Rxv. 1596, 1605 (1965).
See also H. Pimups, A Fmrt BOOK OF ENGUSH LAw 108 (6th ed. 1970).
145. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
146. For discussions of this and related theories, see authorities cited in note 20 supra.
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ral law constraints upon the exercise of state and local power to
regulate land use in the public interest. Accordingly, categorization
of land that rationally promotes a legitimate state objective is a
permissible means of regulating human conduct. Property interests
in land, themselves legitimately subject to redefinition by the state,
are affected only consequentially by such regulation; the extent to
which those interests confer protected economic expectancies upon
their owners also is a legislative, not a judicial, determination. Pur-
gation of natural law from the fourteenth amendment and recogni-
tion of the state's inherent power to define "property" are prerequi-
sites to the proper accommodation of limited land resources to the
changing needs of society.
